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Feedback Loop Failure:
Implications for the Self-Regulation of the
Sharing Economy
Abbey Stemler*
Ratings and reviews are the lifeblood of the Sharing
Economy. They create a reputation proxy that makes us feel
comfortable jumping into strangers’ cars, sleeping in their beds,
and having meals at their kitchen tables. However, new and
existing evidence from the fields of psychology and behavioral
economics shows us that these feedback loops might be flawed,
which can impair the risk calculus for Sharing Economy users
and potentially limit who has access to the benefits of Sharing
Economy platforms. This Article examines how proposed theories
for regulating the Sharing Economy depend on accurate feedback
mechanisms, and argues that this belief should be questioned.
Instead of relying on the wisdom of the crowd, we might be
relying on the collective bias of the crowd to our detriment.
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INTRODUCTION
Thousands of rooms, houses, yurts, and castles are reserved
on Airbnb each day.1 Soon-to-be travelers, who are sometimes
thousands of miles away from their future resting places, make
their selections based on host-provided descriptions, pictures,
and former guest reviews.2 The latter are essential for building
trust and giving travelers the confidence they need to interact
with strangers.3 These feedback loops or reputation systems
make up part of the “real innovation”4 of the Sharing Economy,5
1. Airbnb is a company that built an online marketplace that allows
people to list and rent unique accommodations around the world. About Us,
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
2. See id. (stating that Airbnb has over three million listings in over 191
countries worldwide).
3. PWC, CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES: THE SHARING ECONOMY 9
(2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/industry/entertainment-media/publications
/consumer-intelligence-series/assets/pwc-cis-sharing-economy.pdf (finding that
69% of people surveyed do not trust Sharing Economy companies until they are
recommended to do so by a trusted individual).
4. Thomas L. Friedman, Welcome to the ‘Sharing Economy,’ N.Y. TIMES
(July 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/friedman-
welcome-to-the-sharing-economy.html (referring to the “framework of trust”
created by ratings and reviews, insurance policies, and identity verification on
Airbnb).
5. The term “Sharing Economy” is a complicated one. It is a misnomer
because participants on Sharing Economy platforms are often motivated by self-
interest and not altruism. Matthew Yglesias, There Is No “Sharing Economy,”
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thereby solving George Akerlof’s seminal “lemons problem”6 and
leading to a world where there is a “diminished need for
regulatory oversight and legal remedies because consumers
[can] police misconduct themselves.”7 As Airbnb’s founder and
CEO Brian Chesky states: “[C]ities can’t screen as well as
technologies can screen. Companies have these magical things
called reputation systems . . . government should exist as the
place of last recourse.”8
However, examined more closely, these reputation systems
appear to be skewed to the positive, which unsurprisingly can
have an impact on their utility. For example, 95% of the offerings
on Airbnb have guest-generated ratings of 4.5 stars or higher
(out of five).9 Similarly, Uber, the digital ride-hailing company,
self-reports that in San Francisco, less than 1% of rides are rated
below three out of five stars.10 Is it possible that nearly 100% of
transactions are positive? Unlikely, even with the help of
“magic.”11
In recent scholarly debates concerning the regulation of the
Sharing Economy, the accuracy of the feedback mechanism
incorporated into platforms has largely been unquestioned.12
SLATE (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/12/26/myth
_of_the_sharing_economy_there_s_no_such_thing.html. However, for ease of
argument, this paper capitalizes the term Sharing Economy and defines what
exactly is meant by it in Part I of this Article. See infra Part I.
6. See generally Adam Thierer et al., How the Internet, the Sharing
Economy, and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons” Problem,
70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 830 (2016). The lemons problem relates to the sale of used
cars. Akerlof shows that a used car barely driven will sell for well below the
price of the same car new. Absent information of quality, buyers are unsure
whether they are buying a lemon and thus require a significant price discount
in exchange for the risk they take. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970).
7. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Less Regulation, More Reputation, in THE
REPUTATION SOCIETY 63 (Hassan Masum & Mark Tovey eds., 2012).
8. Jason Clampet, Airbnb CEO Responds to Illegal Rentals Story: “First of
All It’s Not Illegal Everywhere,” SKIFT (Jan. 11, 2013, 3:00 AM),
https://skift.com/2013/01/11/airbnb-responds-to-illegal-rentals-story-first-of-
all-its-not-illegal-everywhere/ (emphasis added).
9. Georgios Zervas, Davide Proserpio & John W. Byers, A First Look at
Online Reputation on Airbnb, Where Every Stay is Above Average 1 (Jan. 28,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm
?abstract_id=2554500.
10. Nairi Hourdajian, Feedback Is a Two-Way Street, UBER NEWSROOM
(Apr. 23, 2014), https://newsroom.uber.com/2014/04/feedback-is-a-2-way-street.
11. See TOM SLEE, WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING
ECONOMY 91–108 (2016).
12. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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However, new and existing evidence from the fields of
psychology and behavioral economics shows us that these
reputation systems might be flawed, which can lead to
uninformed decision-making and user harm. As they develop
new ways to regulate the Sharing Economy, regulators must
take a critical look at their dependency on these reputation
systems.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I provides a brief
overview of the Sharing Economy. Part II details how reputation
systems work and highlights how scholars, regulators, and
industry rely on reputation systems to self-regulate the Sharing
Economy. Part III demonstrates how reputation systems are
flawed. They fail to accurately represent the quality of past
transactions, they can be manipulated by fraudulent reviews
and inappropriate inputs, and users can have difficulty
interpreting the reputation information presented. The Article
concludes by offering potential solutions to address various
forms of feedback loop failure. By exploring the limitations of
reputation systems, this Article will help regulators and
industry improve this useful and essential feature of the Sharing
Economy.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY
The Sharing Economy is thought to be a disruptive force
that allows for the monetization of underutilized assets and
schedules through modern technology.13 At its best, the Sharing
Economy facilitates transactions and the proliferation of
microbusinesses through peer-to-peer information sharing.14
Ostensibly, it also brings with it many benefits such as job
creation and more efficient and sustainable allocation of
resources leading to lower prices and greater access to goods and
services.15
13. Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition,
FAST COMPANY (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-
sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-definition.
14. Abbey Stemler, Regulation 2.0: The Marriage of New Governance and
Lex Informatica, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 87, 113 (2016) [hereinafter
Stemler, Regulation 2.0].
15. The Airbnb Community’s Economic Impact in Portland, AIRBNB
CITIZEN (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.airbnbcitizen.com/the-airbnb-communitys
-economic-impact-in-portland/ (arguing that participating in the Sharing
Economy allows for people to pursue entrepreneurship and non-traditional
forms of work such as free lancing and self-employment); Rashmi Dyal-Chand,
Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative Capitalist System,
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However, truly wrapping one’s head around the Sharing
Economy is not easy for two reasons. First, the Sharing Economy
involves a variety of diverse activities that allow people to
capitalize on their schedules (Taskrabbit, Handy, etc.), vehicles
(Uber, Lyft, RelayRides, etc.), real estate (Airbnb, VRBO, etc.),
and other assets (Spinlister for bikes, LendingClub for extra
cash, etc.). These activities must be distinguished from those of
incumbent firms (hotels, taxi companies, banks, etc.) and
passive online platforms such as Craigslist.16 Second, the
Sharing Economy is constantly changing. Many Sharing
Economy companies that existed in 2013 vanished by 2016.17
And, the ones that did survive have and will continue to evolve
considerably. Therefore, a simple definition cannot possibly
cover all of the diversity in and iterations of the Sharing
Economy.18 That said, many (including myself) have tried to
create a working definition.19
In an earlier article, I defined Sharing Economy companies
based on four characteristics.20
1. Platforms. The Sharing Economy relies on platforms that
connect supply- and demand-side users.21 For example,
Uber has a platform that connects drivers with passengers
and Lending Club has a platform that connects lenders with
90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 256–59 (2015) (describing the supply- and demand-side
benefits of the Sharing Economy); Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell &
Adam Thierer,The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The
Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 531–34 (2015)
(stating that the Sharing Economy creates value by allowing underutilized
assets to be put to productive use); PWC, supra note 3, at 9 (finding that 86% of
adults in the United States agree that the Sharing Economy makes life more
affordable).
16. Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy,
43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 58 (2016) [hereinafter Stemler, Betwixt and
Between].
17. Abbey Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy and Its Implications
for Regulating Innovation, 67 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter
Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy] (finding that of 152 companies that
had all four characteristics (described below) of a Sharing Economy company in
2013, fewer than 60% survived to 2016).
18. Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 101 (2016)
(stating that “the platform economy defies simple definitions”).
19. Botsman, supra note 13; see, e.g., ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING
ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED
CAPITALISM 26–30 (2016); Stemler, Betwixt and Between, supra note 16.
20. Stemler, Regulation 2.0, supra note 14, at 115–22; Stemler, Betwixt and
Between, supra note 16.
21. Stemler, Betwixt and Between, supra note 16, at 57–58.
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individuals who need small loans. These platforms facilitate
transactions by advertising, standardizing contract terms
(including price in many cases), processing payments,
creating searchable databases, and collecting and distilling
information about participants for participants, among
other things.22 They also make it easy for supply-side23 users
to match their assets and schedules with consumer demand
by reducing barriers of entry and overhead costs in exchange
for small fees.24
2. Microbusinesses. Instead of relying on employees and
full-fledged businesses to meet the demand of consumers on
Sharing Economy platforms, many Sharing Economy
companies (at least in their early stages) rely on
microbusinesses.25 These microbusinesses run by
microentrepreneurs represent the smallest form of
producers and are therefore the ones most likely to be
sensitive to burdensome regulation.26
3. Excess Capacity. Supply-side users sell their personal
excess capacity in whatever form on Sharing Economy
Platforms.27 Utilization of excess capacity supports the
microentrepreneur frame, and distinguishes supply-side
users from traditional firms who amass assets or employee
workers in order to generate revenue.28
4. High-Powered Information Exchange. Lastly, platforms
allow for the immediate and comprehensive exchange of
information about supply- and demand-side users through
the Internet.29 This information exchange relies on GPS and
other technologies and allows users to quickly assess each
22. Id.; Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local
Government Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the “Shared Economy” 36
(N.Y.U. Marron Inst. Urban Mgmt., Working Paper No. 21, 2015).
23. Supply-side users are those that provide time and assets in exchange
for money on Sharing Economy platforms. Demand-side users are those that
receive and pay for access to those services and assets.
24. Stemler, Betwixt and Between, supra note 16, at 57–58; see also Lobel,
supra note 18, at 110–11 (discussing the ways platforms reduce entry and
overhead costs).
25. Stemler, Betwixt and Between, supra note 16, at 58–62.
26. Id. at 56–57.
27. Id. at 62–63.
28. Id.
29. Stemler, Regulation 2.0, supra note 14.
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other’s reliability and trustworthiness via reputation
systems.
These characteristics are similar to those suggested by
Sharing Economy experts Professor Arun Sundararajan and
Professor Orly Lobel,30 and have been relied on to explain the
uniqueness of the Sharing Economy and to justify limited
regulation.31 However, many supply-side users on Sharing
Economy platforms are no longer microbusinesses selling their
excess capacity.32 Instead, much of Airbnb’s revenue comes from
professional hosts listing their properties full-time.33 On
Lending Club, the majority of loans come largely from
institutional investors.34 And with Uber, there is much debate
about whether drivers are employees instead of independently-
contracting microentrepreneurs.35 For these reasons, we can no
30. SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 19, at 26–27 (identifying the following
characteristics of the Sharing Economy economic system: market-based,
utilization of excess capacity (“high-impact capital”), “networks” as opposed to
centralized institutions, “[b]lurring [the] lines between the personal and the
professional,” and “[b]lurring lines between fully employed and casual labor,
between independent and dependent employment, [and] between work and
leisure”); Lobel, supra note 18, at 107–112 (identifying ten “principles” of the
Sharing Economy (Lobel uses the term “platform economy”) including: excess
capacity, profit-motivated transactions, customized product offerings, reduced
barriers to entry for supply-side users, and dynamic information via reputation
systems).
31. See Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy, supra note 17, at 12–
15 (explaining how the excess capacity and microentrepreneur characteristics
have caused regulators to take a “hands-off” approach); see also infra Part II.
32. Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy, supra note 17, at 14–15
(discussing how most of platform revenue comes from supply-side users who are
actually professionals listing assets on a full-time basis (as opposed to
monetizing excess capacity) or employees (as opposed to independent
contractors)).
33. OFFICE OF THEN.Y. STATEATTORNEYGEN., AIRBNB IN THECITY (2014),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report.pdf (finding that almost half of
Airbnb’s revenue in New York City in 2010 came from users with more than
three listings); JohnW. O’Neill & Yuxia Ouyang, Penn State Univ. Sch. of Hosp.
Mgmt., Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n, From Air Mattresses to Unregulated
Business: An Analysis of the Other Side of Airbnb (Sept. 2016), https://www
.ahla.com/sites/default/files/Airbnb_Analysis_September_2016_0.pdf (finding
that nearly 30% of Airbnb’s revenue in fourteen of the largest cities in the
United States comes from full-time listings).
34. Shelly Banjo, Wall Street Is Hogging the Peer-to-Peer Lending Market,
QUARTZ (Mar. 4, 2015), http://qz.com/355848/wall-street-is-hogging-the-peer-to-
peer-lending-market/.
35. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining
Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673 (2016); Robert
Sprague, Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing Economy: Square Pegs
Trying to Fit in Round Holes, 31 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 53 (2015) (applying
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longer rely on the above four characteristics to distinguish
Sharing Economy companies from others. Instead, we must
focus on two of the four characteristics—platforms and high-
powered information exchange—to define what is meant by the
term “Sharing Economy.”36 Furthermore, for simplicity, this
Article will focus almost all of its examples and discussion on
three of the largest Sharing Economy companies—Uber, Airbnb,
and Lending Club. Regardless of how we precisely slice the
Sharing Economy, reputation systems can still motivate the
hands-off approach taken by regulators. This is a problem
because, as demonstrated in the sections below, these systems
can be biased and improperly influenced.
II. “MAGICAL” REPUTATION SYSTEMS: THE
REGULATORY PANACEA?
The Sharing Economy is viewed in large part as an
innovative way to meet consumer needs. Hate waiting for a taxi?
Request an Uber and you will be able to digitally watch a car
drive to your door. Want to live like a local in Paris? Stay in an
Airbnb. Both its simplicity and newness created a zeitgeist for
the Sharing Economy as demonstrated by the books,37
traditional tests for the employee vs. independent contractor distinction to
Sharing Economy businesses).
36. These two characteristics closely resemble the four characteristics of
“digital matching firms” identified by the U.S. Commerce Department’s
Economics and Statistics Administration. They include (1) using information
technology systems to “facilitate peer-to-peer transactions,” (2) relying on
reputation systems, (3) providing flexibility to supply-side users, and (4) supply-
side users using their own assets to provide services. Rudy Telles, U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce,Digital Matching Firms: A New Definition in the “Sharing Economy”
Space, http://web.archive.org/web/20161121225411/http://esa.gov/sites/default
/files/digital-matching-firms-new-definition-sharing-economy-space.pdf.
37. See, e.g., RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS:
THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010); ROBIN CHASE, PEERS INC:
HOW PEOPLE AND PLATFORMS ARE INVENTING THE COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY
AND REINVENTING CAPITALISM 4 (2015); BRYAN KRAMER, SHAREOLOGY: HOW
SHARING IS POWERING THE HUMAN ECONOMY (2015); GEOFFREY G. PARKER,
PLATFORM REVOLUTION: HOW NETWORKEDMARKETS ARE TRANSFORMING THE
ECONOMY AND HOW TO MAKE THEM WORK FOR YOU (2016); ALEX STEPHANY,
THE BUSINESS OF SHARING: MAKING IT IN THENEW SHARING ECONOMY (2015);
SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 19.
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conferences,38 and organizations39 that have sprung up since its
inception. This excitement for the Sharing Economy is
compounded by the positive impacts on the economy.40 An oft-
cited PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) study estimates that
by 2025 the Sharing Economy will have global revenues of
around $335 billion.41
In response to the Sharing Economy, lawmakers have taken
a variety of approaches to regulate it—from bans to creating
Sharing Economy specific laws.42 Since many activities in the
Sharing Economy like short-term rentals and home sharing are
regulated at the local level, a comprehensive and accurate
empirical examination of Sharing Economy regulations will
likely never be completed. However, we can see glimpses into
general trends from industry reports published by various
organizations. For example, the libertarian think tank R Street
has compiled a report that provides an overview of regulations
on short-term rentals such as Airbnb. R Street found that in
38. See, e.g., FT Sharing Economy Summit Europe 2016, FINANCIAL TIMES
LIVE, https://live.ft.com/Events/2016/FT-Sharing-Economy-Summit-Europe-
2016 (last visited Apr. 3, 2017) (discussing the July 5, 2016 Sharing Economy
Summit); Sharing Economy Conference: Boston with Julia Ledewitz, ROBERT&
PATRICIA SWITZER FOUND., http://www.switzernetwork.org/events/sharing-
economy-conference-boston-julia-ledewitz (last visited Apr. 3, 2017) (describing
an all-day conference on the Sharing Economy on December 12, 2013); The
Future of the Sharing Economy, YPO, https://www.ypo.org/2015/09/the-future-
of-the-sharing-economy/ (last visited May 5, 2017) (describing YPO’s Sharing
Economy conference); The Think and Be-Tank for a Collaborative Society,
OUISHARE, http://ouishare.net/en/about (last visited May 5, 2017) (discussing
the yearly OuiShare Fest).
39. See, e.g., About, PEOPLE WHO SHARE, http://www.thepeoplewhoshare
.com/about/ (last visited May 5, 2017); About, SHAREABLE, http://www
.shareable.net/about (last visited May 5, 2017); About Us, SHARING ECONOMY
UK, http://www.sharingeconomyuk.com/about-us (last visited May 5, 2017).
40. The U.S. Conference of Mayors stated in 2013 that “Sharing Economy
companies have proven to be engines of innovation and job creation, driving
economic development in the hearts of American cities, where joblessness is still
most pervasive.” U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, 81ST ANNUAL MEETING,
APPROVAL OF RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF POLICIES FOR SHAREABLE CITIES
(2013), https://www.usmayors.org/the-conference/resolutions/?category=c10102
&meeting=81st%20Annual%20Meeting.
41. PwC, supra note 3, at 14.
42. See Bryant Cannon & Hanna Chung, A Framework for Designing Co-
Regulation Models Well-Adapted to Technology-Facilitated Sharing Economies,
31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 23, 41–53 (2015) (providing an overview of
attempts to regulate ride sharing and short-term rentals); Stephen R. Miller,
First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J.ONLEGIS. 147,
184–95 (2016) (creating a taxonomy of regulatory approaches with a specific
focus on short-term rentals).
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fifty-nine of the largest cities in the United States, eleven do not
“explicitly either allow or prohibit” short-term rentals,43 twenty-
one have “some sort of tailored legal framework,” though some
are more restrictive than others,44 and ten cities “effectively ban”
the practice through existing law, including some of those with
short-term rental specific laws.45 On the whole, the R Street
report suggests that roughly half of cities studied were open to
short-term rental services by scoring a B- or better on its
report.46 Similarly, the Texas A&M Transportation Institute’s
Transportation Policy Center (TTI) produced a research study
on existing regulations of Transportation Network Companies
(TNCs) like Uber.47 TTI’s report showed that as of the summer
of 2016, around two-thirds of states (thirty-four) had enacted
some form of regulation of TNCs.48 Most of these regulations
appear to codify existing TNC practices such as background
checks, insurance, and cashless payments and are thus only
mildly restrictive.49
While regulation is varied, based on their relative success it
appears that major Sharing Economy companies have not been
terribly overburdened with regulation.50 This is due, in part, to
43. R Street calls these the “silent cities.” ANDREW MOYLAN, R STREET,
ROOMSCORE 2016: SHORT-TERM RENTAL REGULATION INU.S. CITIES 11 (2016),
https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSTREET55.pdf.
44. Id. at 5–6, 11–12.
45. Id. at 6, 12.
46. Id. at 11–12.
47. Uber, Lyft and Other TNCs: How Governments Are Approaching Ride-
Hailing Regulation, 52 TEX. TRANSP. RESEARCHER, No. 3, 2016, at 10.
48. Id. at 11.
49. Karen Weise, This Is How Uber Takes Over a City,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (June 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/features/2015-06-23/this-is-how-uber-takes-over-a-city (“Each government,
whether municipal or state, goes through its own process to craft rules, but in
the end, officials generally codify the insurance coverage, background-check
policies, and inspection protocols Uber already has in place.”); see also Stemler,
The Myth of the Sharing Economy, supra note 17 (detailing ways in which the
Sharing Economy is under-regulated).
50. Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, and LendingClub are all valued at over a billion
dollars. Ankit Ajmera, Airbnb Valued at $13 Billion as It Discusses Employee
Stock Sale: WSJ, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2014, 9:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com
/article/us-airbnb-financing-idUSKCN0ID03420141024; Katie Roof, Lyft Seeks
$6 Billion Valuation in Funding Round, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 1, 2017), https://
techcrunch.com/2017/03/01/lyft-seeks-6-billion-valuation-in-funding-round/;
Stock Valuation Information for LendingClub Corporation, YAHOO! FINANCE,
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/LC/key-statistics?p=LC (last visited Mar. 27,
2017); Lauren Thomas, Airbnb Just Closed a $1 Billion Round and Became
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the reputation systems that are incorporated into company
platforms.51
Regulators and scholars cite reliance on reputation systems
to help address the market failure of asymmetric information.52
Asymmetric information is what allows buyers and sellers to
take advantage of one another in a transaction.53 In traditional
transactions, each party has exclusive knowledge about the
quality of what they are offering—such as the ability to pay or
the authenticity of the good being sold. Buyers and sellers thus
have incentives to withhold information to get a better deal for
themselves. With reputation systems, by contrast, information
about a participants’ trustworthiness, which corresponds to the
probability that the transaction will go smoothly, is right out in
the open. This creates transparency and helps users make good
choices and protect themselves from harm and dissatisfying
transactions. Furthermore, reputation systems create incentives
for participants to self-police. Logic suggests that if you know
your reputation is tied to future benefits, you will be a good
guest, host, passenger, borrower, etc. For these reasons, many
Profitable in 2016, CNBC (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/09
/airbnb-closes-1-billion-round-31-billion-valuation-profitable.html.
51. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY: ISSUES FACING
PLATFORMS, PARTICIPANTS & REGULATORS 38 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-
participants-regulators-federal-trade-commission-staff/p151200_ftc_staff
_report_on_the_sharing_economy.pdf (“[R]eputation systems likely have
facilitated in part the tremendous growth of sharing economy markets.”).
52. See, e.g., Disrupter Series: How the Sharing Economy Creates Jobs,
Benefits Consumers, and Raises Policy Questions: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong.
2 (2015) (statement of Hon. Michael C. Burgess, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce) (“Sharing
platforms are inherently good [at] providing reputation feedback loops.”); FED.
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 51, at 32 (“[A] seller’s favorable reputation can
provide important leverage for regulators seeking to ensure consumers are
protected when shopping online.”); Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin,
Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies
Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293, 296–301 (2016) (suggesting
that regulation should focus on the “efficiencies” of platforms, including
reputation systems); Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating
Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 463–65
(2015) (arguing that regulators need to focus on the unique characteristics of
the Sharing Economy when regulating, especially reputation systems); Thierer
et al., supra note 6, at 845 (arguing that reputation systems solve information
asymmetry problems).
53. See ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY,
STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 18 (2d ed. 2012) (citing Friedrich Hayek, The Use of
Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945)).
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scholars believe that reputation systems can allow the Sharing
Economy to self-regulate because participants will essentially
police and protect themselves.54 However, before regulators
decide to let the platforms run without oversight, we must ask
ourselves, do these reputation systems really work? To answer
this question, it is helpful to start by looking at what reputation
systems actually are.
A. THEMAKING OF REPUTATION SYSTEMS
Professor Eric Goldman asserts that reputation systems are
systems that “aggregate and disseminate reputational
information,” which he defines as “information about an actor’s
past performance that helps predict the actor’s future ability to
perform or to satisfy the decision-maker’s preferences.”55
Goldman’s definition of reputational information fails to include
other inputs such as gender, race, and social networks that are
now used by some reputational systems to predict future
behavior.56 Therefore, this Article expands on and borrows from
Goldman’s definition to define a reputation system in the
Sharing Economy as a system that aggregates and distills a
variety of data about an individual to predict the “future ability
to perform or to satisfy the decision-maker’s preferences.”57
The inner workings of reputation systems in the Sharing
Economy differ based on the platform, but they are all focused
on helping users predict the behavior of their counterparts and
54. See Andrew T. Bond, An App for That: Local Governments and the Rise
of the Sharing Economy, 90 NOTREDAMEL. REV. 77, 95–96 (2015) (arguing that
reputational incentives require users to self-regulate and thus should face
minimal regulations); Raymond H. Brescia, Regulating the Sharing Economy:
New and Old Insights into an Oversight Regime for the Peer-to-Peer Economy,
95 NEB. L. REV. 87, 140–41 (2016) (discussing how feedback can punish bad
behavior on platforms and support self-regulation); Cannon & Chung, supra
note 42, at 63 (suggesting that reputation systems can help with quasi-self-
regulation, but also noting bias and inaccuracies in those systems); Molly Cohen
& Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer
Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 129 (2015) (arguing that
reputation systems can correct for information asymmetries and allow for self-
regulation); Thierer et al., supra note 6 (arguing that reputation systems solve
the problem of asymmetrical information).
55. Eric Goldman, Regulating Reputation, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE:
ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293, 294 (Berin Szoka & Adam
Marcus eds., 2010).
56. For example, Lending Club grades borrowers on a variety of data
points. See infra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
57. Goldman, supra note 55; see also Thierer et al., supra note 6, at 845.
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creating incentives for participants to “behave.”58 This creates
the necessary trust signals for participants to engage with one
another in such intimate ways.59 Sharing Economy platforms
encourage and sometimes require both supply- and demand-side
users to provide feedback about the quality of their transactions
after they are complete. For example, “[a]t the end of every trip,
[Uber] riders have the opportunity to rate their experience by
providing 1 to 5 stars.”60 Drivers, on the other hand, must
provide a 1 to 5 star rating to their passengers.61 Ratings for
drivers are calculated very simply by averaging the driver’s past
five hundred reviews.62 Drivers whose feedback scores become
too low can be deactivated from Uber’s system.63 In the context
of Airbnb, hosts and guests are rated after each transaction on
numerous levels from cleanliness to communication and
comments are written.64
Reputational data is synthesized by platforms and
transformed into ratings to make it easy for users to understand.
These ratings, along with written reviews (depending on the
platform), serve as a proxy for the reliability and
trustworthiness of a participant.65 They guide consumer
decisions and reward high-quality users and punish low-quality
ones.66 For example, on peer-to-peer lending sites, like Lending
58. For example, some reputation systems rely on large swaths of data
inputs from a variety of sources, while others rely exclusively on user-generated
feedback. Thierer et al., supra note 6, at 858, 864 (classifying reputation
systems into “centralized or third-party mechanisms” and “peer-to-peer
mechanisms”).
59. Koen Franken & Juliet Schor, Putting the Sharing Economy into
Perspective, ENVTL. INNOVATION& SOCIETAL TRANSITIONS (forthcoming 2017),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2017.01.003 (“The digital platforms are able to
make stranger sharing less risky and more appealing because they source
information on users via the use of ratings and reputations.”).
60. Driving with Uber: A Closer Look at Ratings, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/info/driver-ratings/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2017).
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. How Do Star Ratings Work?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help
/article/1257/how-do-star-ratings-work (last visited Feb. 23, 2017); All About
Reviews: A Community Help Guide, AIRBNB (Mar. 1, 2016, 11:18 PM), https://
community.withairbnb.com/t5/Hosts/All-About-Reviews-A-Community-Help-
Guide/td-p/38099.
65. BÉNÉDICTE DAMBRINE, JOSEPH JEROME & BEN AMBROSE, FUTURE OF
PRIVACY FORUM, USER REPUTATION: BUILDING TRUST AND ADDRESSING
PRIVACY ISSUES IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 4 (June 2015), https://fpf.org/wp-
content/uploads/FPF_SharingEconomySurvey_06_08_15.pdf.
66. Goldman, supra note 55, at 296.
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Club, “grades” or some other form of score, which corresponds to
the interest rate, are given to each loan.67 For Lending Club,
these scores are based on an individual’s FICO score, a
proprietary scoring model, the loan term, and loan amount.68
Investors can then select which loans they would like one-by-one
or with automatic investing criteria.69
Not surprisingly, markets with reputation systems are more
efficient (i.e., more trades are made) than markets without.70
And supply- and demand-side users both benefit from these
systems. Supply-side users receive better prices for their goods
and services when they have higher reputation scores.71 And
demand-side participants rely on reviews to make informed
selection decisions.72 However, just because they are helpful
does not mean they are perfect, as the section below
demonstrates.
B. HOWWELL REPUTATION SYSTEMSWORK
Reputation systems work to a degree. Because reputational
information is sourced from many different data points,
problems with asymmetric information are alleviated because
information about quality, safety, etc. are not in the exclusive
possession of participants.73 Furthermore, if reputation systems
did not work, Airbnb would not have the 60 million users it has
67. What Is Lending Club Offering as an Investment?, LENDING CLUB,
https://help.lendingclub.com/hc/en-us/articles/215437388-What-is-Lending-
Club-offering-as-an-investment- (last visited May 5, 2017).
68. LENDINGCLUB, MEMBERPAYMENTDEPENDENTNOTESPROSPECTUS 10
(2014), https://www.lendingclub.com/fileDownload.action?file=Clean_As_Filed
_20140822.pdf&type=docs.
69. Id. at 50.
70. Gary E. Bolton et al., How Effective Are Electronic Reputation
Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation, 50 MGMT. SCI. 1587, 1592 (2004)
(comparing various markets including those with and without feedback
mechanisms).
71. Mikhail I. Melnik & James Alm, Does a Seller’s Ecommerce Reputation
Matter? Evidence from eBay Auctions, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 337, 339 (2002)
(demonstrating a positive correlation between reviews and price).
72. Study Finds Consumers Rely on Ratings, Reviews and
Recommendations During Recession, TARGETMARKETING (Feb. 26, 2009),
http://www.targetmarketingmag.com/article/study-finds-consumers-rely-
ratings-reviews-and-recommendations-during-recession/ (finding that before
making a purchase, 77% of online consumers consider ratings and reviews).
73. See generally Paul Resnick et al., Reputation Systems: Facilitating
Trust in Internet Interactions, COMM. ASS’N COMPUTING MACHINERY, Dec.
2000, at 45, 45.
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and Uber would not be coordinating over 1 million trips per
day.74
However, reputation systems within the Sharing Economy
have their flaws. Bad things can and still do happen, particularly
related to consumer safety, fraud, and dissatisfying
transactions. For example, in the ride-sharing arena, the
consumer protection website www.whosdrivingyou.com keeps a
comprehensive list of safety incidents. As of January 9, 2017, the
following incidents were reported: 62 alleged assaults by drivers,
208 alleged sexual assaults and harassments, and 9 alleged
kidnappings.75 Similarly, people are sometimes fraudulently
tricked into booking fake listings with fake reviews on Airbnb.76
And more commonly consumers are dissatisfied when goods and
services are not as promised. This might be why Uber has an F
rating with the Better Business Bureau77 and Airbnb has a 1.5
out of 10 stars (from 1530 reviews) from Trustpilot, an online
review community.78 These consumer complaints represent a
persistent, if not terribly widespread, problem within the
Sharing Economy.
III. PROBLEMS WITH REPUTATION SYSTEMS
Sharing Economy platforms want their reputation systems
to facilitate trust and encourage repeat transactions. For a
reputation system to work well three requirements must be met:
1) reputation information accurately represents the quality of
past transactions;79 2) the reputation system cannot be
74. About Us, supra note 1; UBER, Our Commitment to Safety, https://
newsroom.uber.com/our-commitment-to-safety/ (last visited May 5, 2017).
75. The “Alleged Assaults” list contains 62 entries, which appears to be
more accurate than the website’s self-count of 57. Reported List of Incidents
Involving Uber and Lyft, WHO’SDRIVING YOU?, http://www.whosdrivingyou.org
/rideshare-incidents.html (last visited May 5, 2017).
76. See infra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
77. Patrick Hoge, Uber and Lyft Both Get an “F” from the Better Business
Bureau; So Does Yellow Cab, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www
.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2014/10/uber-lyft-f-better-business-
bureau.html. Note that as of April 2017, Lyft has an A+ rating by the Better
Business Bureau in San Francisco. Lyft, Inc., BBB, https://www.bbb.org/greater
-san-francisco/business-reviews/car-service/lyft-inc-in-san-francisco-ca-379827
(last visited Apr. 21, 2017).
78. User Reviews of Airbnb Lodging, TRUSTPILOT, https://www.trustpilot
.com/review/www.airbnb.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
79. See Chris Nosko & Steven Tadelis, The Limits of Reputation in Platform
Markets: An Empirical Analysis and Field Experiment 34 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
688 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:2
manipulated by fraudulent reviews or irrelevant information;
and 3) users accurately interpret reputation information.80
Unfortunately, there is evidence that all three of these
assumptions may be incorrect, which “may have a cascading
error effect on the performance of the computational algorithms
[used by reputation systems].”81 These problems could lead
consumers down frustrating and potentially dangerous paths.
They could also unintentionally shut out good actors, whose
reputational scores are incorrect because of race or other
irrelevant factors.
A. ACCURATE REPRESENTATION OF PAST TRANSACTIONS
It makes intuitive sense that if incorrect information is fed
to a reputation system (“garbage in”), the reputation system will
not accurately reflect trustworthiness (“garbage out”). “Garbage
in” can come from many sources, in particular cognitive biases.
Cognitive biases involve “replicable pattern[s] in perceptual
distortion, inaccurate judgment and illogical interpretation” of
data.82 These biases arise from various processes, such as
information-processing shortcuts (heuristics),83 the mind’s
limited information-processing capacity,84 social influence,85 etc.
Research, Working Paper No. 20830, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers
/w20830.
80. Id.
81. Tanja Pavleska & Borka Jerman Blažič, User Bias in Online Trust
Systems: Aligning the System Designers’ Intentions with the Users’ Expectations,
36 BEHAV. & INFO. TECH. 404, 404, 405, 420 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080
/0144929X.2016.1239761 (finding that those users involved in reputation
systems “exhibit distinction bias, positivity bias, anchoring effect, and framing
effect,” which impacts the implementation of reputation systems).
82. Adrian P. Brady, Error and Discrepancy in Radiology: Inevitable or
Avoidable?, 8 INSIGHTS INTO IMAGING 171, 178, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih
.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5265198/pdf/13244_2016_Article_534.pdf; see Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1131 (1974) (looking at heuristics that “lead to
systematic and predictable errors” due to cognitive biases). See generally DAN
ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS (2008) (exploring cognitive biases).
83. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Subjective Probability: A
Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 431 (1972)
(“[P]eople replace the laws of chance by heuristics.”).
84. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J.
ECON. 99, 99 (1955) (rejecting the assumption that man has “a well-organized
and stable system of preferences”).
85. See generally X. T. Wang, Frédéric Simons & Serge Brédart, Social Cues
and Verbal Framing in Risky Choice, 14 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2001)
(testing the effect social cues have on behavioral decision-making).
2017] FEEDBACK LOOP FAILURE 689
Information about previous transactions in a reputation system
may be biased for four primary reasons: reporting bias, fear of
retaliation, reciprocity bias, and the herding effect.86 Lastly, bias
in the form of racial discrimination can also distort reputation
scores. Each of the aforementioned forms of bias is discussed in
turn.
1. Reporting Bias
Accurate reviews are public goods; therefore, they are likely
to be underprovided.87 However, non-response alone does not
cause feedback loop failure. Instead, the problem comes from the
well-documented reporting bias, which can positively skew the
pool of provided feedback.88
Similar to Thumper’s rule, “[i]f you can’t say something nice,
don’t say nuthin’ at all,”89 reporting bias causes users with
extremely positive (or negative) views to rate transactions more
often than users with mediocre experiences. Professors
Chrysanthos Dellarocas and Charles Wood, who empirically
studied the accuracy of the eBay feedback system (a system very
similar to those in the Sharing Economy), show how this
phenomenon creates inaccurate feedback.90 They found that in
approximately 21% of all transactions, eBay buyers are mildly
to very dissatisfied, despite a reported 99% satisfaction rate.91
86. As demonstrated in the subsections below, these biases often bleed into
one another, but for purposes of argumentation, they have been separated out.
87. They are neither excludable nor rivalrous, and they are useful for the
entire population. See Nolan Miller, Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser,
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method, 51 MGMT. SCI.
1359, 1359 (2005); Andrey Fradkin, Elena Grewal & David Holtz, The
Determinants of Online Review Informativeness: Evidence from Field
Experiments on Airbnb 2 (Mar. 15, 2017), http://andreyfradkin.com/assets
/reviews_paper.pdf.
88. Reporting bias is very similar to selection bias, which has also been
found to bias reputation systems. Selection bias means that if reviews are not
mandatory, “[r]eviewers are disproportionately drawn from the subset of
potential consumers who are favorably predisposed toward the resource.” See
Mark A. Kramer, Self-Selection Bias in Reputation Systems, in TRUST
MANAGEMENT, 238 INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR INFORMATION
PROCESSING 255, 256 (2007).
89. BAMBI (Disney 1942).
90. Chrysanthos Dellarocas & Charles A. Wood, The Sound of Silence in
Online Feedback: Estimating Trading Risks in the Presence of Reporting Bias,
54 MGMT. SCI. 460 (2008).
91. Id. at 461. Similar results were found for sellers. They have an
estimated dissatisfaction level of roughly 14%.
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Similar results have been found on Airbnb’s platform.92 Airbnb
reviews are notably more positive than those posted on sites like
TripAdvisor.93 The rate of five-star reviews is “31% on
TripAdvisor and 44% on Expedia compared to 75% on Airbnb.”94
Reporting bias in the Sharing Economy is caused by two
main forces. First, participants might want to avoid “pay[ing] a
premium to future trading partners” for bad feedback.95 On
systems where you can see prior feedback given by a user,
negative feedback might cause users to avoid transactions.96 In
other words, people may perceive the user as tough or hard to
please. This explanation is related to the fear of retaliation as
described below.
Second, the Sharing Economy involves more personal
interaction between users (as opposed to anonymous online
interactions); therefore, people are more likely to empathize with
one another.97 This empathy could cause a user to internally
justify not reporting negative feedback because they may
attribute the bad experience to something other than the fault
of the seller (attribution bias). Furthermore, the more
similarities individuals find in one another, the more likely they
are to view each other positively (homophily).98
92. Fradkin et al., supra note 87.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id. (citing Dina Mayzlin, Yaniv Dover & Judith Chevalier, Promotional
Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation, 104 AM.
ECON. REV. 2421 (2014)).
95. See JOHN J. HORTON & JOSEPH M. GOLDEN, REPUTATION INFLATION:
EVIDENCE FROM AN ONLINE LABOR MARKET 13 (2015), https://pdfs
.semanticscholar.org/59d6/e24bf80c01384d5ce8a64e1582208b8b7072.pdf.
96. See id. at 27 (“[R]eputation inflation occurs in an online marketplace
and . . . the cause is driven by the costs associated with leaving negative
feedback.”); see also Seth Porges, Dear Would-Be Airbnb Guests: Here’s Why
Hosts Keep Turning You Down, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/sethporges/2016/01/18/dear-would-be-airbnb-guests-heres-
why-hosts-keep-turning-you-down (describing how hosts do not like to pick
users who leave negative reviews on past stays with other hosts). Currently on
Airbnb’s site, there is a two-step process to see prior guest reviews (prospective
hosts have to click on a prior host’s review and scroll to see the guest’s review),
so hosts really have to want the information; however, they can in fact see it.
97. See James Andreoni & Justin M. Rao, The Power of Asking: How
Communication Affects Selfishness, Empathy, and Altruism, 95 J. PUB. ECON.
513, 514 (2011) (finding feelings of empathy to be strongly correlated to sharing
conversations with others); Fradkin et al., supra note 87, at 4.
98. Fereshteh Ghazizadeh Ehsaei & Ab. Razak Che Hussin, Acceptance of
Feedbacks in Reputation Systems: The Role of Online Social Interactions, 4
INFO. MGMT. & BUS. REV. 391, 398 (2012).
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The influence of social interactions might also explain why
Airbnb guests who stay in private rooms as opposed to entire
homes, give higher ratings.99 They presumably have more
interaction with guests. For example, when Airbnb surveyed
guests who did not leave reviews, responses included: “‘Our host
made us feel very welcome and the accommodation was very nice
so we didn’t want to have any bad feelings.’ ‘I also assume that
if they can do anything about it they will, and didn’t want that
feedback to mar their reputation!’”100
2. Fear of Retaliation
In the Sharing Economy, your reputation is your key to both
earning and saving money. Therefore, in order to garner good
reviews, participants have an incentive to withhold negative
reviews in order to avoid retaliation. While many platforms no
longer utilize non-simultaneous review systems,101 a perceived
threat might still linger, meaning people might not know that
they cannot be retaliated against. To illustrate this point we can
look to another eBay study, which this time was conducted by
Professors Gary Bolton, Ben Greiner, and Axel Ockenfels. These
professors found that on a non-simultaneous review system
actual retaliation is rare (less than 2% of feedback in the data
they analyzed could be considered retaliatory).102 However,
people still responded to the threat of retaliation.103 The
professors demonstrated this by analyzing the timing of
feedback, which is correlated with the feedback’s content. If a
buyer was going to give negative feedback, 70% of the time he or
she waited until after the seller had given feedback.104
Beyond fear of retaliation in the form of negative reviews,
participants may be fearful of retaliation in other respects. For
example, an Airbnb host who gives a guest a bad review might
99. Fradkin et al., supra note 87, at 21.
100. Id. at n.4.
101. Non-simultaneous meaning that reviewers can see feedback from their
counterparts as soon as it’s submitted.
102. Gary Bolton, Ben Greiner & Axel Ockenfels, Engineering Trust:
Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information, 59 MGMT. SCI. 265, 282
(2013). The actual level of retaliation might be higher. Professors Luís Cabral
and Ali Hortaçsu found that in a sample of “almost 10,000 negative/neutral
instances in [their] data, 2,462 resulted in a retaliatory comment by the seller.”
Luís Cabral & Ali Hortaçsu, The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Evidence from
eBay, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 54, 70 (2010).
103. Bolton et al., supra note 102, at 282.
104. Id. at 268–69.
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become worried that the guest knows where she lives and likely
has her phone number.
3. Reciprocity Bias
People reciprocate like behavior with like.105 For example,
in restaurants, servers can positively influence tipping behavior
by smiling and touching a customer, introducing themselves by
name, providing candy with a check, and writing certain images
and messages on checks.106 Similar techniques can lead to
inflated reviews on Sharing Economy platforms. If, for example,
a host or a driver provides a bottle of wine, a mint, or a friendly
smile, those actions might lead to higher reviews regardless of
merit. More directly, if a platform uses a non-simultaneous
reveal system, a user who receives positive feedback from a
transaction partner would be more likely to reciprocate and
provide positive feedback, even if a mediocre or negative review
would be more accurate.107
105. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The
Economics of Reciprocity, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 159.
106. See April H. Crusco & Christopher G. Wetzel, The Midas Touch: The
Effects of Interpersonal Touch on Restaurant Tipping, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 512 (1984); see also Stephen F. Davis et al., Restaurant Servers
Influence Tipping Behavior, 83 PSYCHOL. REP. 223 (1998); Kimberly Garrity &
Douglas Degelman, Effect of Server Introduction on Restaurant Tipping, 20 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 168 (1990); Nicolas Guéguen, The Effects of a Joke on
Tipping when It Is Delivered at the Same Time as the Bill, 32 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1955 (2002); Jacob Hornik, Tactile Stimulation and Consumer
Response, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 449 (1992); Amy S. Ebesu Hubbard et al.,
Effects of Touch on Gratuities Received in Same-Gender and Cross-Gender
Dyads, 33 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2427 (2003); Michael Lynn & Kirby
Mynier, Effect of Server Posture on Restaurant Tipping, 23 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 678 (1993); Bruce Rind & Prashant Bordia, Effect on Restaurant
Tipping of Male and Female Servers Drawing a Happy, Smiling Face on the
Backs of Customers’ Checks, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 218 (1996); Bruce
Rind & Prashant Bordia, Effect of Server’s “Thank You” and Personalization on
Restaurant Tipping, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 745 (1995); Bruce Rind &
David Strohmetz, Effect on Restaurant Tipping of a Helpful Message Written on
the Back of Customers’ Checks, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 139 (1999); Reneé
Stephen & Richard L. Zweigenhaft, The Effect on Tipping of a Waitress
Touching Male and Female Customers, 126 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 141 (1986); David
B. Strohmetz et al., Sweetening the Till: The Use of Candy to Increase
Restaurant Tipping, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 300 (2002); Kathi L. Tidd &
Joan S. Lockard, Monetary Significance of the Affiliative Smile: A Case for
Reciprocal Altruism, 11 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 344 (1978).
107. Dellarocas & Wood, supra note 90, at 467.
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4. Herding
Lastly, the herding effect, which leads to unconscious bias
based on information about prior reviews, might also lead to
inflated reviews.108 In a randomized experiment, Professors
Muchnik, Aral, and Taylor demonstrated how prior positive
ratings on an unnamed social news aggregator website increased
the likelihood of subsequent positive ratings.109 Their simple
experiment looked at the “up” and “down” votes that comments
to news articles could receive on the news website.110 The up and
down votes were aggregated and the rating for each comment
was based on the total number of up votes minus the total
number of negative votes.111 The rating for any given comment
was displayed next to it.112
The researchers randomly put comments into three groups:
“up-treated, down-treated, or control.”113 The comments that
were submitted to the up-treated group were given one up-vote
and vice versa for the down-treated group.114 The control group
was not given a vote. While initial negative votes did not impact
the likelihood of subsequent votes, initial positive votes
increased the probability of someone giving a subsequent
positive vote by 32%.115 And on the whole, the overall ratings
among up-treated groups were 25% higher than the control
group.116 Again, initial negative reviews had no influence.117
This suggests that in addition to all of the ways reviews might
be skewed toward the positive (as mentioned in the subsections
above), initial confederate or fake positive reviews on Sharing
Economy platforms can amplify the herding effect.
108. Zervas, Proserpio & Byers, supra note 9, at 2. The herding effect is
related to the well-studied anchoring effect. The anchoring effect relates to how
people are influenced by previously suggested reference points (such as
previously-given high reviews) when making their assessments. See Tversky &
Daniel, supra note 82, at 1128–30.
109. See Lev Muchnik, Sinan Aral & Sean J. Taylor, Social Influence Bias:
A Randomized Experiment, 341 SCIENCE 647, 647 (2013).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 648.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 649.
694 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:2
Confirmation bias, which is “[t]he tendency to interpret new
evidence as confirmation of one’s existing beliefs,”118 can also
exacerbate the herding effect. For example, if a passenger has a
low rating, an Uber driver may interpret innocuous behavior,
like failing to make small talk, as unfriendly and give the
passenger a negative review.119
All four biases identified above may lead to review
inflation.120 Unfortunately, the extent to which reviews are
skewed is difficult to precisely determine. Nonetheless, it is
clear that inflation does exist. Tom Slee, a vocal Sharing
Economy critic, compared Netflix and Yelp ratings, where there
is very little if any personal connection between the reviewed
and the reviewer, with Sharing Economy ratings, which often
involve much more personal interaction.121 Slee’s findings show
that the degree to which ratings are skewed is apparent.122 Both
Netflix and Yelp ratings show a normal (bell curve) distribution,
with both sets of ratings congregating towards the middle with
a fewer extremely high and low ratings (see Figures 1 and 2,
respectively).123
118. Confirmation Bias, OXFORD DICTIONARIES (last visited May 5, 2017),
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/confirmation_bias.
119. Nancy Leong, New Economy, Old Biases, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2153, 2163
(2015).
120. The Sharing Economy is not alone in review inflation. A 2001 study of
eBay found that reviews were overwhelmingly positive. Paul Resnick & Richard
Zeckhauser, Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empirical
Analysis of eBay’s Reputation System, in 11 ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNET AND
E-COMMERCE (Michael R. Baye ed., 2002).
121. See generally SLEE, supra note 11.
122. Id. at 96–98.
123. Slee’s data set for Netflix came from a set of 100 million ratings that
Netflix released for its Netflix Prize competition. Slee’s data set for Yelp came
from Yelp. Id. at 96–97. [Figures 1–4 are used with Mr. Slee’s permission. – Ed.]
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However, when Slee looked at Sharing Economy ratings, he
found that the ratings for Airbnb and BlaBlaCar, a ride-sharing
platform used mostly in Europe, to look more like J-curves than
bell curves (see Figures 3 and 4, respectively).124
124. The BlaBlaCar distribution is based on distribution of a set of 190,000
ratings from the blablacar.com site. Id. at 98–99; Tom Slee, Some Obvious
Things About Internet Reputation Systems, TOM SLEE (Sept. 29, 2013),
http://tomslee.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/2013-09-23_reputat
ion_systems.pdf.
Figure 1 Figure 2
Figure 3
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A study examining proprietary Airbnb data supports Slee’s
findings but dampens the alarm bells somewhat.125 That study
found that in both a non- and simultaneous-reveal system, there
was inconsistency between what guests reported publicly
(meaning the feedback would be shared on the site) and
privately but it was very small.126 In the non-simultaneous
reveal system, for example, 6% of guests who privately said they
“would not recommend their host” nonetheless gave their hosts
a five-star public rating.127
Regardless of the extent, it is clear that there is a significant
inflation of scores, which is likely created by biased reviews,
either consciously or unconsciously given. In addition, reviews
might be skewed to the positive because users may be unable to
provide a negative review. On Airbnb for example, if an Airbnb
guest arrives at an unacceptable host site and cancels her
reservation, she is unable to give a review.128 This means if a
125. Andrey Fradkin et al., Bias and Reciprocity in Online Reviews:
Evidence From Field Experiments on Airbnb, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH
ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION (2015).
126. Id. at 2–3.
127. Id. at 3.
128. See, e.g., What’s the Worst That Can Happen With Airbnb?,
AIRBNBHELL (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.airbnbhell.com/whats-worst-can-
Figure 4
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place is so dirty or unacceptable so as to cause someone to find
emergency alternative accommodations, that feedback will not
be reported on the public reviews.129 All of the forms of bias and
design choices mentioned in this subsection must be examined
in order to make sure reputation systems can effectively protect
consumers and achieve the desired goals of regulation.
5. Race and Gender Bias
A final way reputation information might not accurately
represent past transactions involves implicit and explicit race
and gender bias.130 The Sharing Economy involves personal
interactions that make the race and gender of the supply- and
demand-side users more salient, and there is compelling
evidence that Airbnb has been associated with facilitating
discrimination based on race.131 For example, Harvard
Professors Benjamin Edelman and Michael Luca found that
after controlling for all host information that a guest sees
(number of rooms, ratings, location, etc.) non-black hosts in New
York City charge 12% more in rental income than black hosts.132
In a similar study, Edelman and Luca along with Dan Svirsky
found “that requests from guests with distinctively African-
American names are roughly 16% less likely to be accepted
[than] identical guests with distinctively White names.”133
happen-airbnb/ (detailing the issues the user went through when they could not
enter the property, and that when the reservation was canceled, they were
unable to post a review).
129. This inability to report cancelled reservations is reported consistently
on the AirbnbHell webpage. Id.
130. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006) (introducing the general
concept of implicit bias in the discrimination context).
131. Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the Sharing Economy, 43 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (explaining how the intimate nature of
transactions in the Sharing Economy heightens the salience of sex and can lead
to discrimination).
132. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case
of Airbnb.com 3, 8 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014), http://
www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/Airbnb_92dd6086-6e46-4eaf-9cea-
60fe5ba3c596.pdf.
133. Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial
Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment 1
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-069), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty
/Publication%20Files/16-069_5c3b2b36-d9f8-4b38-9639-2175aaf9ebc9.pdf.
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Clearly, race is inappropriately used to signal the quality of both
supply- and demand-side users.134
In terms of reputation scores specifically, a recent study
showed that with regard to TaskRabbit,135 “[b]lack workers,
especially men, receive significantly lower feedback scores than
other workers with similar attributes.”136 These low scores could
be compounded by the herding effect and the associated
confirmation bias. In addition, “[w]omen, especially White
women, receive 10% fewer reviews than men with equivalent
work experience.”137 While this finding does not indicate
whether women are scored lower than men, it is indicative of a
distortion in reputation scores.
Unfortunately, Sharing Economy companies have much less
incentive to prevent biases based on immutable or irrelevant
traits (such as race, gender, religion, national origin, or sexual
orientation), than they do to prevent bias that could lead to
consumer harm or dissatisfaction. Therefore, regulation is
necessary to address this form of market failure.
B. REVIEWMANIPULATION AND INAPPROPRIATE INPUTS
Sharing Economy advocate, Rachel Botsman, stated in one
of her very popular TED Talks that in the Sharing Economy,
“reputation will be your most valuable asset.”138 Indeed, positive
ratings and reviews can increase revenues,139 and negative ones
can decrease them.140 However, once people start viewing
134. Note that Airbnb has taken several steps to reduce discrimination on
its platform as detailed in a report produced in 2016. LAURA W. MURPHY,
AIRBNB’S WORK TO FIGHT DISCRIMINATION AND BUILD INCLUSION: A REPORT
SUBMITTED TO AIRBNB (2016), http://blog.airbnb.com/wp-content/uploads/2016
/09/REPORT_Airbnbs-Work-to-Fight-Discrimination-and-Build-Inclusion.pdf.
135. TaskRabbit is a platform that allows users to hire help for small jobs
and tasks.
136. ANIKO HANNAK ET AL., BIAS IN ONLINE FREELANCE MARKETPLACES:
EVIDENCE FROM TASKRABBIT 5 (2016), http://datworkshop.org/papers/dat16-
final22.pdf.
137. Id.
138. Rachel Botsman, The Currency of the New Economy Is Trust,
TEDGLOBAL (June 2012), https://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_the
_currency_of_the_new_economy_is_trust.
139. See Michael Luca, Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of
Yelp.com 13–15 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 12-016, 2011), http://
www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=41233.
140. Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Brand Image or Gaming the System?
Consumer “Gag” Contracts in an Age of Crowdsourced Ratings and Reviews, 7
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 59, 66 (2016).
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reputation as an asset, there are strong market incentives to
make that asset as valuable as possible even through ethically
(and perhaps legally) dubious means, such as writing fake
reviews for themselves, having friends and family write fake
reviews, or paying or offering free goods and services to people
who write positive reviews.141 Fake reviews are especially likely
at the beginning of a supply-side user’s engagement on a
platform when there is the “cold start” problem.142 The cold start
problem involves a chicken or the egg situation—in order to
build a reputation, you have to have a reputation. Therefore,
people have a strong incentive at the beginning of their time on
a platform to generate fake reviews.
Reviews manipulation problems have plagued online
commerce since the dawn of the modern Internet era.143 Outside
of the Sharing Economy, there are both anecdotes and research
studies that reveal how pervasive and easy manipulation of
online reviews can be.144 For example, when a software error
caused Amazon’s Canadian website to reveal the actual
identities of book reviewers, it was clear that a large number of
reviews were written by confederates, such as the authors and
their friends and publishers.145 Similarly, a recent study found
that 16% of the reviews on the crowd-sourced review site for local
businesses, Yelp, were not genuine.146 A few instances have even
been reported where reviews were written for fake or never-
opened establishments.147 Thus, it would not be surprising that
141. See generally Kaitlin A. Dohse, Note, Fabricating Feedback: Blurring
the Line Between Brand Management and Bogus Reviews, 2013 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 363, 365 (2013).
142. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 51, at 43.
143. See, e.g., Nan Hu et al., Manipulation of Online Reviews: An Analysis
of Ratings, Readability, and Sentiments, 52 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 674 (2012),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2011.11.002; Nan Hu et al., Manipulation in
Digital Word-of-Mouth: A Reality Check for Book Reviews, 50 DECISION
SUPPORTSYS. 627 (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2011.11.002; Nan Hu et
al., Fraud Detection in Online Consumer Reviews, 50 DECISION SUPPORT SYS.
614 (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2010.08.012.
144. See generally Umit G. Gurun & Alexander W. Butler, Don’t Believe the
Hype: Local Media Slant, Local Advertising, and Firm Value, 67 J. FIN. 561
(2012).
145. Hu et al., Manipulation of Online Reviews: An Analysis of Ratings,
Readability, and Sentiments, supra note 143, at 674.
146. Michael Luca & Georgios Zervas, Fake It Till You Make It: Reputation,
Competition, and Yelp Review Fraud (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper Series,
No. 14-006, 2015).
147. See Raphael Brion, Graham Elliot’s Unopened Resto Gets a Negative
Yelp Review, EATER (Sept. 1, 2010, 4:55 AM), http://eater.com/archives /2010/09
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reviews on Sharing Economy platforms may be inappropriately
manipulated.
While some Sharing Economy platforms are likely to be
more susceptible to review manipulation than others,148 spend a
few minutes on www.airbnbhell.com and you are likely to see
how people can get tricked into booking and perhaps staying in
unacceptable accommodations because of fraudulent reviews.149
Some even suspect that platforms themselves manipulate
reviews through deletion.150 While these suspicions have not
been proven, based on Airbnb’s content policy it would have the
ability to remove a review, “in whole or part,” for any reason at
its “sole discretion.”151 Furthermore, Airbnb and other platforms
do have an incentive to inflate the quality of reviews somewhat
in order to increase the number of transactions from which they
derive revenue.152
/01/graham-elliots-grahamwich-gets-negative-yelp-review.php; see also Grant
Martin, Fake Nautical Restaurant on TripAdvisor Gets Glowing Reviews,
FORBES (July 29, 2013, 11:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/grantmartin
/2013/07/29/fake-restaurant-on-tripadvisor-gets-glowing-reviews.
148. Uber drivers, for example, have no easy way to select their passengers.
Therefore, it is harder to manipulate their ratings through confederate reviews.
Requesting a Specific Driver, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/1aaf0913-484f-
4695-9042-e61fc7613f24 (last visited May 5, 2017) (“The Uber app cannot match
you with a specific driver. When you request a ride, your app sends your request
to nearby drivers to pick you up at your pickup location.”).
149. Airbnb: A Place for Scammers and Fraud, AIRBNBHELL (Oct. 30, 2016),
http://www.airbnbhell.com/airbnb-a-place-for-scammer-fraud/ (describing how
a listing on Airbnb had several good reviews and pictures, but turned out to be
completely fake); From a Loyal Airbnb Customer to a Duped One, AIRBNBHELL
(July 16, 2016), http://www.airbnbhell.com/loyal-airbnb-customer-duped-one/
(describing how an Airbnb listing with good reviews actually turned out to be a
fraudulent listing); Terrible Airbnb Apartment in San Diego Hillcrest,
AIRBNBHELL (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.airbnbhell.com/terrible-airbnb-
apartment-san-diego-hillcrest/ (describing how an apartment was terribly dirty
and unacceptable despite having positive reviews).
150. Airbnb Deletes Negative Reviews, Favors Hosts, AIRBNBHELL (Jan. 2,
2016), http://www.airbnbhell.com/airbnb-deletes-negative-reviews-favors-hosts
(claiming that Airbnb deleted the negative aspects of the guest’s review); Airbnb
Removes Negative Reviews and Host Scams Guests!, AIRBNBHELL (Feb. 24,
2016), http://www.airbnbhell.com/airbnb-removes-negative-reviews-host-scams
-guests/ (claiming that review was deleted); Angela Rhodes, Our Bleh Airbnb
Experience, PERPETUAL TRAVELS (Feb. 6, 2012), http://angelarhodes.blogspot
.com/2012/02/our-bleh-airbnb-experience.html (claiming that Airbnb deleted
the guest’s negative review).
151. What Is Airbnb’s Content Policy?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com
/help/article/546/what-is-airbnb-s-content-policy (last visited May 5, 2017).
152. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 51, at 46 (citing Chrysanthos
Dellarocas’s comments about how Sharing Economy companies have the
incentives to increase the number of transactions on platforms).
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In addition to review manipulation, inappropriate inputs
can affect the quality of reputation systems. These inputs can
come from big and small data sources. Small data is in the
context of user-generated inputs, which can be influenced by
factors that are outside the control of the person being evaluated.
For example, an Uber passenger may give a driver a bad review
because they are frustrated by traffic. Big data in the context of
reputation scores are the products of more complex algorithms
powered by a huge variety of inputs. These algorithms may
perpetuate inappropriate and inaccurate biases.153
As outlined in her best-selling book, Weapons of Math
Destruction, Cathy O’Neil describes how inputs that comprise
what she calls e-scores for platforms like Lending Club “march
us back in time” and allow for users to base reputation on proxies
unrelated to a person’s actual trustworthiness.154 This is why
someone who lives in a bad neighborhood that is associated with
a risky demographic in terms of credit might end up with an
inappropriately low grade on Lending Club’s platform.155 O’Neil
argues that reputation systems should exclusively focus on how
an individual has behaved in the past and not how people who
are similar to that individual have behaved in the past.156
If reputation systems rely on inappropriate data, they might
shut out certain “worthy” members of the Sharing Economy.157
Think again of someone trying to get a loan on Lending Club. If
her grade is low because of her neighborhood, social network,
etc., she may be unable to get a loan despite her actual ability to
repay the loan. As reputation systems become more
sophisticated, concerns about the “black box” algorithms they
use will likely grow.158 To address these concerns, regulators will
153. See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA
INCREASES INEQUALITY ANDTHREATENSDEMOCRACY 3 (2016) (“[M]any of these
[algorithms] encod[e] human prejudice, misunderstanding, and bias into the
software systems that increasingly manag[e] our lives.”).
154. Id. at 145 (she calls these “people like you” proxies).
155. Id. (noting that when e-score systems carry out “people like you”
calculations in reference to a particular individual, “if enough of these ‘similar’
people turn out to be deadbeats or, worse, criminals, that individual will be
treated accordingly”).
156. Id. at 146.
157. Inappropriate data is perhaps a more precise term than inaccurate,
because there is likely some predictive value of that data.
158. FRANK PASQUALE, THEBLACKBOX SOCIETY: THE SECRETALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROLMONEY AND INFORMATION 8–9 (2015).
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have to insist on transparency to make sure that these systems
are fair and nondiscriminatory.159
C. ACCURATE INTERPRETATION OF REPUTATION INFORMATION
Assuming platforms could ensure complete accuracy of
reviews and appropriate inputs, users would still need to
correctly interpret the reputational data. Previous work on
intuitive judgment in psychology suggests that even given
accurate feedback information, humans are still subject to a
number of biases that impair their interpretation of reputational
information.160 More specifically, consumers will interpret
reputational information based on how it is presented.161 For
example, in a controlled experiment, Professors James Wolf and
Waleed Muhanna found that users will have a preference for
someone with a handful of very good ratings (meaning the
“strength” is high) over someone with a much greater number of
ratings but a slightly lower overall score (meaning the “weight”
is high).162
Users might also have difficultly interpreting reputational
data because it is presented in a confusing or limited manner.
For example, Lending Club has a somewhat befuddling way of
presenting loans.163 There are blogs and numerous help guides
designed to teach people how to interpret the data.164
Furthermore, Uber does not let you see anything but the star
ratings of drivers and passengers, meaning you do not have
context as to how many times they have been reviewed or more
detailed comments about their past performance. When
159. Id.
160. Miriam J. Metzger, Andrew J. Flanagin & Ryan B. Medders, Social and
Heuristic Approaches to Credibility Evaluation Online, 60 J. COMM. 413 (2010);
James R. Wolf & Waleed A. Muhanna, Feedback Mechanisms, Judgment Bias,
and Trust Formation in Online Auctions, 42 DECISION SCI. J. 43, 45 (2011).
161. Wolf & Muhanna, supra note 160, at 45.
162. Id. (describing this phenomenon as overemphasizing “compositional
strength (i.e. the proportion of positive ratings given in the past)” and under-
emphasizing the “weight” of the evidence, which is based on the total number
of transactions rated).
163. See Manual Investing, LENDING CLUB, https://www.lendingclub.com
/browse/browse.action (last visited May 5, 2017).
164. See, e.g., Simon Cunningham, Risk Tolerance 101: What P2P Loan
Grades Should I Pick?, LENDINGMEMO (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www
.lendingmemo.com/risk-grades-lending-club-prosper/; FAQ, LENDING CLUB,
https://www.lendingclub.com/public/investing-faq.action (last visited May 5,
2017).
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reputational data is not easily understood, or can easily play into
known cognitive biases, the usefulness of the data is limited.
IV. IMPROVING REPUTATION SYSTEMS
Flaws in reputation systems are real. However, all three
problems with reputation systems discussed above can be
mitigated through thoughtful design choices. This section
suggests improvements for each reputation system problem and
highlights the need for regulation to assure systems are
effective.
A. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF INPUTS
Bias significantly inflates reviews and impairs the risk
calculus for users.165 To correct for bias in reputation systems
platforms and regulators should consider the following design
recommendations.
1. Make Reviews Mandatory
Reporting bias causes people who have mediocre
experiences to not report their feedback.166 To ensure that
mediocre feedback is recorded, platforms can require users to
provide feedback before they can use the platform again. For
example, before a passenger can book another Uber ride or a
guest can book another Airbnb, he or she must give feedback.
Platforms would likely argue that making reviews mandatory,
especially for demand-side users, could potentially impact user
satisfaction—not many people enjoy giving reviews. However,
tradeoffs will have to be made to make the reputation systems
more accurate.
2. Mathematically Correct for Certain Biases
Platforms can mathematically correct for reporting and
reciprocity biases by identifying various “red flags” for inflated
reviews and adjusting feedback scores accordingly. For example,
platforms can begin or continue to collect two sets of feedback:
feedback that the user knows will become public and feedback
that the user knows will stay private. If the public review is more
positive than the private review (because of reciprocity or fear of
retaliation), the review can be discounted (i.e. not be given as
much weight in an overall user score). In addition, if reviews are
165. See supra Part III.
166. SLEE, supra note 11, at 103–05.
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not mandatory and a user is consistently not reviewed
(presumably because of the reporting bias), the user’s overall
score can be lowered appropriately.167 Platforms can also
continue to study the biases and tendencies discussed in this
Article and identify other potential red flags to correct for
inflated reviews.
3. Make Feedback Non-Instantaneous
Platforms can utilize non-instantaneous feedback in order
to reduce retaliation bias. An experiment by researchers at MIT
and Airbnb, showed that implementation of simultaneous reveal
increased review rates by 1.8% and decreased five-star ratings
by 1.5%, thereby suggesting that people were being more
honest.168 Furthermore, to reduce perceived threats of
retaliation, systems can clearly inform users that feedback will
not be available to the other user until that user has submitted
feedback.
4. Inform Users of Bias
While the literature is limited, there is some evidence that
suggests that awareness of bias can reduce biased behavior.169
For example, Professors Devin Pope, Joseph Price, and Justin
Wolfers analyzed the behavior of NBA referees after a very well-
publicized study on referee bias was released.170 The original
study examined over a decade of referee personal foul calls.171 It
found that personal fouls were more likely to be called against
players by opposite-race referees than by same-race referees (so
much so that it had an appreciable effect on the outcome of
167. See Dellarocas & Wood, supra note 90, at 474–75 (finding that the
decision not to provide feedback provides useful information about the quality
of the transaction).
168. Fradkin et al., supra note 87, at 24.
169. See Devin G. Pope, Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, Awareness Reduces
Racial Bias (ES Working Paper Series, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/awareness_reduces_racial_bias_wolfers.pdf; Laurie A.
Rudman, Richard D. Ashmore & Melvin L. Gary, “Unlearning” Automatic
Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856, 866 (2001) (finding that individuals who
became aware of their own racial bias and cared about correcting it had reduced
levels of explicit prejudice and stereotyping; however, the same was not found
for implicit biases).
170. Pope, Price & Wolfers, supra note 169.
171. Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, Racial Discrimination Among NBA
Referees, 125 Q.J. ECON. 1859 (2010).
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games).172 Pope and his colleagues found that after the original
study was released, the bias among referees disappeared.173
They argue that “decisions made by individual referees can be
impacted by simply making them aware of their own racial
bias.”174 Similar studies have demonstrated how strategies to
prevent bias can influence behavior.175
The studies above fall in line with the dual-process theory
of cognition, which breaks down judgment into two basic
systems: System 1 and System 2.176 System 1 thinking deals
with operations that are “automatic, effortless, associative, [and]
implicit (not available to introspection).”177 System 2 thinking,
by contrast, deals with operations that are “slower, serial,
effortful, [and] more likely to be consciously monitored and
deliberately controlled.”178 Dual-process theory suggests that if
people become more aware of the biases in their System 1
thinking, they can more easily shift to System 2 thinking and
question and correct the biases that influence their judgment.179
172. Id. at 1885 (finding “that players have up to 4% fewer fouls called
against them and score up to 2 1/2% more points on nights in which their race
matches that of the refereeing crew”).
173. Pope, Price and Wolfers used the same approach as Price and Wolfers
to determine bias. Pope, Price & Wolfers, supra note 169.
174. Id. at 2.
175. See Patricia G. Devine et al., Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race
Bias: A Prejudice Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1267 (2012) (describing a twelve-week study in which participants
were both exposed to their implicit race bias and taught how to mitigate their
bias via a variety of strategies; experimental group self-regulated and
demonstrated a reduction in bias; control group did not); Kevin W. Eva et al.,
Teaching from the Clinical Reasoning Literature: Combined Reasoning
Strategies Help Novice Diagnosticians Overcome Misleading Information, 41
MED. EDUC. 1152, 1155 (2007) (demonstrating how providing instructions to
“use a combination of analytic and non-analytic reasoning strategies” reduced
the influence of bias and improved clinical decision-making among
participants).
176. Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping
Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 697, 698 (2003).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF
JUDGMENT AND DECISIONMAKING 316 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds.,
2004) (providing an overview of various techniques for reducing bias). The same
might also be true for ethical behavior. See Todd Haugh, Nudging Corporate
Compliance, 54 AM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming). Contra John A. Bargh, The
Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype
Effects, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 361, 378 (Shelly
Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (stating “[i]n my opinion, the evidence to
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Simple nudges to push people into System 2 thinking can
come from the user interface on Sharing Economy platforms. For
example, in order to avoid the reciprocity bias, platforms could
inform users about the bias and tell them to critically reflect on
their transaction. In order to reduce implicit and explicit racial
and gender bias, platforms can provide information to users
about what should and should not be considered when providing
a reputation score. Airbnb currently requires supply-side users
to click-through a screen that says, “[b]efore making a decision
about this trip, focus on your listing’s availability and whether
the guest meets the house rules you set. Factors like race,
religion, or sexual orientation shouldn’t affect your decision”
before accepting or declining a guest.180 Something similar could
be used when asking users to give a review.
5. Avoid Providing Context for Reviews
In order to avoid the consequences of the herding effect,
feedback forms can intentionally make prior reviews difficult, if
not impossible, to see at the time a review is given. Airbnb
already does this by giving each user a specific link via email for
writing a review.181 This link goes directly to the feedback form,
making it difficult to find the specific host information without
opening another computer window and searching for that
information specifically. With ride-sharing apps like Uber, this
is more of a challenge, since rides are typically short and users
can easily remember the reputation scores of their
counterparts.182
6. Aggregate Scores Across Multiple Platforms
Lastly and more ambitiously, Sharing Economy platforms
could collaborate (or at least give a third-party access to
reputational data) to create universal reputation scores that will
translate across multiple platforms. Companies such as eRated
date concerning people’s realistic chances of controlling the influence of their
automatically activated stereotypes weighs heavily on the negative side”).
180. [The warning only becomes visible when making a reservation, so a
citation is not possible. – ed.]
181. All About Reviews: A Community Help Guide, AIRBNB: COMMUNITY
(Mar. 1, 2016), https://community.airbnb.com/t5/Hosts/All-About-Reviews-A-
Community-Help-Guide/td-p/38099.
182. The United States’ average Uber trip is 6.4 miles. Uber Trips Are
Becoming Longer and Faster, But Are They More Profitable?, SHERPASHARE
BLOG (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.sherpashareblog.com/2016/02/uber-trips-are-
becoming-longer-and-faster-but-are-they-more-profitable.
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or Traity are already starting to create such aggregated personal
scores for online sellers.183 Because a universal score would be
based on a more complete set of reputational data, it would
presumably be more accurate as long as the inputs are of high
quality. However, with universal reputation scores, concerns
about privacy and the right to be forgotten will need to be
addressed. China, for example, is working to create a national
system that tracks social credit.184 Such an idea brings up a host
of ethical and legal concerns that are beyond the scope of this
Article.
B. REDUCING REVIEWMANIPULATION
The incentives to manipulate reviews are apparent. Every
Eatwith host,185 TaskRabbit Tasker,186 and Uber driver knows
that his or her business lives and dies by reviews and reputation
scores. How then can Platforms and regulators prevent review
manipulation? The answer lies in both design choices and
enforcing existing legal regimes.
As Professors Mayzlin, Dover, and Chevalier’s research
suggests, when reviews can be made by anyone (even people who
did not actually utilize a good or service), it is more likely that
fraudulent reviews will be given.187 In their study, they found
that hotel reviews on TripAdvisor, where you need not stay in
order to review, were more often fake than Expedia, where you
must stay in order to review.188 To eliminate the opportunity for
reviews to be made by people that did not actually experience a
good or service, Sharing Economy companies should only allow
people to give reviews if they’ve experienced a good or service.
183. See About eRated, ERATED, http://www.erated.co/about.html (last
visited May 5, 2017); Our Mission, TRAITY, https://traity.com/our-mission (last
visited May 5, 2017).
184. See Josh Chin & Gillian Wong, China’s New Tool for Social Control: A
Credit Rating for Everything, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/chinas-new-tool-for-social-control-a-credit-rating-for-everything-
1480351590.
185. Eatwith is a Sharing Economy company that allows people to host and
join meals in people’s homes. Who We Are, EATWITH, https://www.eatwith.com
/brand/about/ (last visited June 13, 2017).
186. TaskRabbit is a website where people can outsource chores such as
shopping and waiting in line for concert tickets to Taskers (people who are
willing to work for small fees). Revolutionizing Everyday Work, TASKRABBIT,
https://www.taskrabbit.com/about (last visited June 13, 2017).
187. See generally Mayzlin, Dover & Chevelier, supra note 94.
188. Id.
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Currently, many Sharing Economy companies do allow only
actual users to provide feedback. However, some platforms do
not permit people to leave a review who cancel a transaction
because it is dissatisfactory (e.g., an Uber rider who cancels
when a dilapidated car pulls up or an Airbnb guest who arrives
at an ant-infested house and decides not to stay). These users
should have an opportunity to give a review, unless they cancel
sight unseen. Furthermore, there should be clear and defensible
guidelines, created by the platforms to determine when a
platform will delete or modify a review.
Similar to detecting and adjusting for biases, algorithms can
also be used to detect fraudulent reviews.189 Crowd-source
review websites like TripAdvisor and Yelp already use such
filters.190 These algorithms are proprietary, but it is clear that
they use inputs such as IP addresses, user-given information
(such as email addresses, physical addresses, Facebook, and
LinkedIn profiles), and past reviews.191 Sharing Economy
189. See, e.g., Review Moderation and Fraud Detection, TRIPADVISOR,
https://www.tripadvisor.com/vpages/review_mod_fraud_detect.html (last
visited June 13, 2017).
190. Id.; Why Yelp Has a Review Filter, YELPBLOG (Oct. 5, 2009), https://
www.yelpblog.com/2009/10/why-yelp-has-a-review-filter. TripAdvisor considers
the following reviews to be fraudulent:
[1] Attempts by an owner to boost his/her own property’s reputation by:
• Writing a review for his/her own property
• Asking friends or relatives to write positive reviews
• Submitting a review on behalf of a guest
• Copying comment cards and submitting them as reviews
• Pressuring a TripAdvisor member to remove a negative review
• Offering incentives such as discounts, upgrades, or any special
treatment in exchange for reviews
• Hiring an optimization company, third party marketing
organization, or anyone to submit false reviews
• Impersonating a competitor or a guest in any way
[2] Attempts by an owner to damage his/her competitors by submitting
a negative review.
Review Moderation and Fraud Detection, supra note 189.
191. Leigh Held, Behind the Curtain of Yelp’s Powerful Reviews,
ENTREPRENEUR (July 9, 2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/235271;
Christopher Williams, TripAdvisor Borrows Anti-Fraud Techniques from
Finance Industry, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk
/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/digital-media/9965211
/TripAdvisor-borrows-anti-fraud-techniques-from-finance-industry.html. On
TripAdvisor, reviews go through an automated process that filters them for
integrity. Linda Fox, Online DNA-How TripAdvisor Puts Reviews Under the
Microscope, TNOOZ (May 28, 2015), https://www.tnooz.com/articles/tripadvisor
-fraudulent-reviews/.
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companies, especially those that create opportunities for
confederate reviews, should adopt similar capabilities.
Furthermore, Sharing Economy companies should remind
reviewers about the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC)
Endorsement Guidelines (Guidelines).192 These Guidelines were
first crafted in 1975193 to protect consumers under Section 5 of
the FTC Act194 and competitors under the Lanham Act.195 The
Guidelines were updated in 2009 to “more explicitly capture
online advertising messages and endorsements through social
media.”196 They create an obligation to disclose any material
connections between the speaker and sponsor197 when writing
an endorsement.198 Examples in the guidelines make it “clear
that a material connection or relationship means anything not
disclosed to the general public that might impact or bias one’s
opinion about a product of service.”199 This could include a friend
or family member writing a confederate review, paying someone
to write a positive review, giving someone a free stay or ride to
give a positive review, etc.200
Platforms should also remind users that various state laws
might penalize them for fake reviews.201 For example, nineteen
businesses in New York were fined over $350,000 in 2013 for
astroturfing, which involves generating false or deceptive
reviews that consumers believe would be from a neutral third-
192. FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsement and Testimonials in
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,124, 53,130–32 (Oct. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 255). For a general discussion of these guidelines, see Robert Sprague
& Mary Ellen Wells, Regulating Online Buzz Marketing: Untangling a Web of
Deceit, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 415, 415–16 (2010).
193. FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsement and Testimonials in
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. at 53,130–32.
194. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
195. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012); Lucille M. Ponte, Mad Men Posting as
Ordinary Consumers: The Essential Role of Self-Regulation and Industry Ethics
on Decreasing Deceptive Online Consumer Ratings and Reviews, 12 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 462, 472 (2013).
196. Ponte, supra note 195, at 472.
197. The sponsor can be persons, partnerships, or corporations including
Airbnb hosts and Uber drivers. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
198. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2009).
199. Ponte, supra note 195, at 473.
200. Id.
201. See Stephen G. Amato, When Rave Reviews Become Risky Re: Internet
Reviews, NAT’L L. REV. (May 22, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/
when-rave-reviews-become-risky-re-internet-reviews.
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party—in violation of New York state law.202 Consumer
protection laws related to fraudulent reviews vary from state to
state, but generally prohibit such activity.203
Finally, to reduce the cold start problem and the strong
incentive to generate fake reviews at the early stages of a users’
participation on a platform, platforms could adopt some of the
proposals mentioned at the Federal Trade Commissions’
Sharing Economy workshop in June 2015 and later reported on
in its very comprehensive report, The “Sharing” Economy: Issues
Facing Platforms, Participants & Regulators.204 One proposal
would require new users to post some sort of bond so that other
users would feel more secure in knowing they would be
compensated if they are dissatisfied with the transaction.205
Another involved platforms screening new participants more
carefully so they would be less dependent on reviews.206
Increasing the awareness of punishment and decreasing
incentives for fake reviews will improve the accuracy of feedback
systems.
C. REDUCING INCORRECT AND INAPPROPRIATE INPUTS
In order to perfect reputation systems, Sharing Economy
platforms must also be open to how to correct for inaccurate and
inappropriate reputational information. Just as we can correct
misinformation about our credit score, platforms should have a
process in place for users to appeal truly baseless feedback.
Furthermore, when big data and algorithms are used to rate
participants, “transparency, meaningful oversight and
procedures to remediate decisions that adversely affect
individuals who have been wrongly categorized by correlation”
202. Press Release, N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eric T. Schneiderman, A.G.
Schneiderman Announces Agreement with 19 Companies to Stop Writing Fake
Online Reviews and Pay More Than $350,000 in Fines (Sept. 23, 2013),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-agreement-19-
companies-stop-writing-fake-online-reviews-and (stating that astroturfing
violates New York Executive Law § 63(12) and New York General Business Law
§§ 349 and 350).
203. Amato, supra note 201. For example, in Kentucky the Kentucky
Consumer Protection Act, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.170 (LexisNexis 1976),
protects against “unfair, false, misleading or deceptive acts or practice in trade
or commerce.”
204. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 51.
205. Id. at 44.
206. Id. at 43–44.
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is required.207 As Professors Danielle Keats Citron and Frank
Pasquale argue, there needs to be some form of “technological
due process” to ensure “algorithms live up to some standard of
review and revision to ensure their fairness and accuracy.”208
Technological due process can be created by allowing individuals
to inspect the accuracy of data inputs and by providing sufficient
information to regulators so that they can ensure systems are
not improperly influenced by irrelevant factors such as race,
gender, or national origin.209
D. IMPROVING INFORMATION COMPREHENSION
We know that people rely more on an overall reputation
score than they do on the predictive validity of that score, which
is based on the number of reviews previously given.210 Therefore,
Platforms should do the math for people and provide them with
a rating that incorporates weight based on previous
transactions.211 In addition, to provide a more accurate single
number, platforms can provide optional multidimensional
reputational data and written comments to provide individuals
a full picture of a participants’ trustworthiness.212
V. CONCLUSION
The recommendations outlined in this Article are but a few
of the approaches Sharing Economy companies can use to
improve reputation systems. But as Professor Dellacoras writes:
“In general, it [is] impossible to design a totally manipulation-
resistant reputation system. No matter what mechanisms one
puts into place, creative and determined users are bound to find
a way around them. For that reason, community administrators
207. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at
the Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum: Privacy Challenges in the Era of
Big Data: A View from the Lifeguard’s Chair 8 (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.ftc
.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-challenges-big-
data-view-lifeguard’s-chair/130819bigdataaspen.pdf.
208. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 19 (2014).
209. Id. at 20, 25.
210. Bolton et al., supra note 70; Melnik & Alm, supra note 71.
211. Wolf & Muhanna, supra note 160, at 62.
212. Ross A. Malaga, Web-Based Reputation Management Systems:
Problems and Suggested Solutions, 1 ELECTRONIC COM. RES. 403, 413 (2001).
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must constantly monitor such systems, organically evolving
their designs.”213
To encourage innovation and constant improvement of
reputation systems, regulators should embrace principles of
New Governance. “New Governance” is an umbrella term for an
approach to regulation that encourages experimentation and
flexibility in regulatory systems.214 New Governance principles
rely on “privileging performance standards over design
standards,” bringing industry into regulatory decision-making
processes, and incorporating “audited self-regulation.”215 By
incorporating these principles in the design of regulations,
regulators can be sure to utilize the expertise of the Sharing
Economy companies themselves. For example, if regulators focus
on the ends and not the means of regulations (improved
consumer safety and prevention of fraud and discrimination,
etc.) via performance standards, they can open the door to
creative problem solving.216 These performance standards can
then be monitored by regulators through the meaningful sharing
of data.
In the future, reputation systems will most likely continue
to be used to create trust between strangers and facilitate
transactions. However, as these systems continue to evolve and
be integrated into the fabric of our daily lives, it becomes
increasingly important to question their utility and identify
problems and strategies for improvement. Assuming data can
provide us with a better picture of the truth than we can achieve
on our own is dangerous, because data’s lack of intimacy is its
greatest weakness. As demonstrated in this Article, reputation
systems can be flawed and creative regulatory oversight is
necessary to ensure these systems are fair, transparent, and
accurate.
213. Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Designing Reputation Systems for the Social
Web (B.U. Sch. Mgmt., Research Paper No. 2010–18) (2010).
214. See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-
Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 6–11 (2008). Other terms for
New Governance concepts include “democratic experimentalism,” “reflexive
law,” “responsive regulation,” and “network governance.” Id.
215. Stemler, Regulation 2.0, supra note 14, at 91.
216. Performance-based regulation sets performance goals and allows firms
to decide how to meet them. See id. at 102.
